Main point: Wisconsin's elections officials have been telling themselves a simple story--"The only threat to election results is Internet hacking, so we can keep elections safe just by keeping the voting machines unconnected."
There's an equally simple--but more true--story they could be telling themselves: "We don't have the power to prevent every type of miscount, but we can keep elections safe anyway, just by using the paper ballots and the canvass to detect and correct miscounts, regardless of cause."
In a recent newspaper article, I wrote that election officials should check the accuracy of our computer-tabulated election results as routinely as city treasurers check our computer-tabulated property tax bills.
That proposal is uncontroversial. Every national election expert promotes routine audits. So do other authorities, such as the US Department of Homeland Security. When presented with the idea that election clerks should verify the right winners before they declare election results final, every voter responds with either “Well, duh” or a wide-eyed “You mean they don’t do that now?!?!”
Wisconsin election officials, however, think that all of us are wrong about that. In response to my article, I received the following email from the county clerk in a mid-sized Wisconsin county:
"Good afternoon, Ms. McKim: Please tell me if a piece of Wisconsin certified equipment has ever been hacked, or how one could even attempt to hack said equipment. The equipment used in my county is never connected to the Internet. It's not even connected to our county network. Unless someone has figured out a way to hack through the unit's power cord, our equipment is basically unhackable."
Except for that last word, my correspondent’s few facts are correct. It's the same argument that county clerks have used for years: “You cannot prove we've been hacked, and we don’t need to check because we never connect the voting machines to the Internet.”
Let’s review a few additional facts. You won’t need to be an IT security expert or a Russian hacker to see the possibilities...Read more
This weekend, election integrity advocates from around the nation will gather in California to share information and ideas for moving America ahead toward fully protected voting rights--including the right to have our votes counted accurately.
The Second Annual National Election Integrity Conference, sponsored by a host of organizations, will convene in Berkeley on Saturday.
The entire conference will be livestreamed on Facebook, and videos of the presentations will go up later on the YouTube channel for the California Election Integrity Coalition.
I (Karen McKim) will be doing two workshops, one with Jan BenDor of the Michigan Election Reform Association, on the lessons from the Wisconsin and Michigan recounts, and one on the auditing election results with digital ballot images. (The materials I'll be distributing are at those links.)
Main point: Public officials must keep the public both safe and calm.
The danger is when reassurance, not safety, becomes the goal.
Election officials are keeping our voter registration system safe.
They are reassuring us about our vote-counting system.
“Smile, you son of a bitch.” – Martin Brody, to the shark.
Yesterday’s Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) meeting was packed with more cameras than I’d ever seen there. A few days earlier, the federal Department of Homeland Security announced that Russian-government backed hackers had tested the security of Wisconsin’s online voter registration system. They hadn’t gotten in. The ‘attack’ was, the computer experts say, like jiggling a locked door knob.
“I don’t get it.” I told a reporter as the meeting got under way. “Hackers are continuously testing every computer system. The Russian government is known for cybercrime. It would be news if they were not testing the security of our elections systems.”Read more
There’s good news and there’s … no-worse-than-usual news.
The good news is that today, the Wisconsin Elections Commission did what no Wisconsin elections agency has done since the introduction of computerized vote tabulation: They decertified a voting machine, the Optech Eagle.
And they did it for the best of reasons: It wasn’t counting our votes reliably. Now that so many ballots are marked in voters' homes, in all sorts of ink, the machine is "no longer meeting voters' and officials' expectations."
This is good. Not perfect, but good. The vote was unanimous. The Commissioners didn't debate whether the machine should be decertified, but how quickly. They didn’t vote to decertify immediately, but they soberly considered that possibility. And they did adopt some immediate safeguards.
As of today, all municipalities using the Optech Eagle must either count mailed-in ballots by hand, or re-make (that is, copy over) them using ink that can be detected by the machines. And they must keep doing that until they replace the machines, no later than December 31, 2018. In addition, if any contest tabulated by an Optech Eagle is recounted, it must be by a hand count.
This decision had several good angles to it.
First, the Commissioners’ comments, specifically mentioning Racine County, indicated that they accepted as true the reports of Liz Whitlock and the other observers during that recount, even though Racine County officials have not yet acknowledged any problems.
Granted, it would have taken chutzpah for the Commissioners actively to deny that Racine miscounted both the election and the recount, given all the hard evidence of similar miscounts from other counties and the weirdly high undervote rates that county's canvass signed off on. But the culture of election officials, in Wisconsin and elsewhere, is to band together against concerned citizens and, if not to deny their truth, at least ignore it. But in the discussion today, I did not pick up one whiff of the get-these-troublesome-citizens-out-of-here attitude to which we’re so accustomed. Good work, Liz and the rest of the Racine team! The State hears you, even if your clerk doesn't (yet).
Second, the ‘requirement’ that any recount be conducted by hand shows more courage and commitment than I’ve seen from any public official in a while. Here’s why: If some county decides to contest that requirement, it’s likely that a court would decide that the WEC has no statutory authority to order a hand-counted recount. The Commissioners were aware of that when they voted, but went ahead anyway. Set aside the fact that recounts are a thing of the past in Wisconsin; I like the kind of leadership that says, “Let’s do the right thing and see if anyone tries to stop us.”
Third, the decision signifies a distinct break from the old Government Accountability Board’s attitude toward elections technology. The old GAB—board and staff—seemed resistant to even the idea that voting machines could miscount. I remember talking with them about the Medford miscount, when misprogrammed machines ignored all straight-party ticket votes. About a third of that city’s votes in a presidential election were lost. GAB staff told me, with a pained expression, “You can’t blame that on the machines!”, as if I would hurt the machine’s feelings if it heard me say it needed to be audited. I can so easily imagine the old GAB Director Kevin Kennedy defending the Optech Eagle with such an argument.
But WEC Director Michael Haas and the Commissioners are willing to take a stand: A machine that cannot count a valid vote has got to go.
I know I may be giving WEC credit for understanding the obvious, but it is a change from the way they were talking only two years ago. And that's good.
The no-worse-than-usual news is, well, unsurprising.
- The staff analysis of decertification stressed cost and convenience for clerks above all other considerations—to the point where I sat there seriously trying to think of how we could frame the risk of undetected election fraud as a cost issue.
- No one ever has investigated or resolved the causes of the worst Optech Eagle miscount. The WEC is just guessing it was the wrong ink. In Marinette, three voting machines missed 9.6%, 26.5%, and 30.8% of the votes on the ballots they processed. It's almost certain that ink had something to do with it, but if the voters marked their ballots at home, why did one section of town use unreadable ink at more than three times the rate of another part of town? And to add to the mystery, the municipal clerk told me that most of the absentee ballots in all three precincts were in-person early voters who marked their ballots in her office. Why would she provide the wrong pen at all, never mind provide it at different rates to the voters from the different precincts? Finally, in the one municipality where WEC staff did do a serious investigation of the cause of an Optech Eagle miscount, they couldn't pin it entirely on ink. Something else was going on with those machines, and remaking the ballots might not fix it.
- Director Michael Haas, on at least two occasions today, referred respectfully to our testimony, and clearly understood what we were saying. But when he spoke most directly to the prospect of future routine election audits, he called it a ‘legislative issue.’ To me, that revealed his perception that Wisconsin’s local election clerks will not agree to verify election results unless forced by law. He’s probably correct, but that’s pretty darn sad. Thank goodness few other public officials take the same attitude toward their work product.
- In my oral testimony, I cited several instances in which county boards of canvass certified obviously incorrect vote totals. I also spoke of the hard fact that none ever verify the vote totals before they certify. Sure enough, like a patellar reflex, the municipal clerk who spoke next offered indignant testimony: “We do too care about accuracy,” without offering any facts to back up that claim.
Sigh. I suppose ‘care’ has several meanings, and I don’t doubt that she “feels concern or interest.“ But it’s also a simple fact that, until she routinely verifies the numbers on the computer tape before certifying them, she does not “exercise serious attention or effort to avoid damage or risk.”
So, WEC's attitude toward election accuracy is improving. But the local election officials still haven't mastered Step 1: Accept that you have a problem.
Inaccurate preliminary vote totals are not a problem--if miscounts
are detected and fixed before election results are declared final.
The problem is, as these incidents show, that Wisconsin's local election officials
are making no effort to detect and correct even obvious miscounts.
Have the hackers noticed that yet?
* * *
Following December's presidential recount, when county clerks reported corrected vote totals to the Wisconsin Elections Commission, they changed at least 17,681 votes from the totals they had previously reported.
Ward by ward, candidates sometimes got more votes, sometimes less. We don't know the full number of miscounted votes, because if recounters both subtracted and added votes to one candidate's total in a single ward, only the net change showed up in the revised totals. Election researchers at the UW-Madison, Harvard, and MIT worked with the data and estimated that in the original results, more than 1 in every 170 votes had been miscounted. *
If you can think of a way to miscount a valid vote, it's likely that somewhere a Wisconsin vote was miscounted like that.
The recount discovered hundreds of absentee ballots still in their envelopes, uncounted on Election Day.
Write-in votes had been treated with extraordinary carelessness. The recount discovered that 1 in every 7 of Evan McMullin's voters had been disenfranchised in the original count. Typos had erased nearly half the votes in precincts in Oneida and Milwaukee Counties. Votes had been double-counted in Eau Claire County.
The miscounts in Marinette, Outagamie, and Racine Counties are of particular interest to those who wonder whether Wisconsin's local election officials are attentive, prudent IT managers.
Those counties and others used a voting machine called the "Optech Eagle." This was once the workhorse of Wisconsin elections, but it never could read votes unless they were marked in an ink that contained carbon.
It didn't read non-carbon ink in 2016, either, when tens of thousands of voters submitted absentee ballots they had marked someplace other than a polling booth equipped with an approved marking device.
So on Election Night, results indicated that Racine County voters were weirdly uninterested in the presidential race. Across the rest of the state, only about 1 in every 130 voters (0.77%) left their ballots blank for president. But in Racine County, almost 1.8% of the ballots were counted as if they were blank. In the City of Racine, the rate was even higher--2.6%. In individual Racine County precincts, up to 1 in every 12 ballots was counted as blank.
In Outagamie County, too, Optech Eagles were telling election officials that dozens of voters had cast no vote for president. In one municipality there, the machine saw no vote for president on more than 1.4% of the ballots.
The machines in the City of Marinette took the prize. The machine that counted ballots cast by absentee voters in the City of Marinette's 7th and 8th Wards printed out results indicating no presidential vote on 9.6% of the ballots. The machine counting Wards 1, 3, and 5 saw no votes on 26.5% of the ballots.
And the machine counting Wards 2, 4, and 6 saw no presidential vote on 30.8% of the ballots it attempted to count.
To their discredit, local election officials either did not notice these obvious errors, or noticed them but chose not to correct them. Officials in these counties signed legal documents attesting that they had reviewed the election results and found them to be "correct and true." But in fact, they hadn't done that at all. At least not until the recount forced them to.
Marinette officials, who conducted their recount by hand, corrected their miscount in the recount. Outagamie officials recounted using the same machines and therefore did not detect their miscount until ordered to do a biennial voting-machine audit in January. By then, it was too late to correct the official vote totals.
Racine County officials still haven't resolved their weird vote totals. They recounted by machine and so certified the bizarre vote totals twice--once after the election and once after the recount--without ever checking to see why they were so weird. In fact, county election officials were so determined to trust unexamined computer output that they refused to check accuracy even after the machines could be seen to be visibly miscounting during the recount.
To their credit, staff of the Wisconsin Elections Commission took steps to figure out what was going on. In January, they asked Outagamie County to send their election materials, including the ballots, to Madison so that staff could examine them and make sure the miscounts were what everyone suspected: an inability to read the ink that many voters used to mark their ballots.
They concluded that ink almost certainly contributed to the miscounts, but that didn't explain all the missed votes. WEC staff concluded “This exercise did not produce a result that allowed staff with confidence to understand how the Optech Eagle treated these ballots.”
Something else, in addition to ink color, was going on, and they couldn't tell what it was.
In June, staff wrote a memo to Commission members, telling them "“The analysis of the performance of the Optech Eagle identified a significant limitation of the equipment.”
The Commission itself then did the right thing, too. They instructed staff to prepare a plan for decertifying the machine, to be decided next Tuesday at their September 26 meeting.
When the Optech Eagle is decertified, it will be illegal to use in Wisconsin. Municipalities will be forced to upgrade to newer machines with enhanced ability to count votes marked in any ink. And that will make our elections a little safer from miscounts. Professor Douglas W. Jones, of the University of Iowa Computer Sciences Department told me: "I've tested the newer machines with everything that I can imagine a voter using. Even glitter pens work, though I still wouldn't recommend them."
We cannot overlook the fact that two failures produced these miscounted election results.
First, the machines miscounted.
Second, local election officials certified those miscounts as "correct and true" anyway.
Replacing the unreliable voting machines with new ones will solve one limited problem. But no sensible person believes that no voting machine will ever again miscount Wisconsin votes. No computer system can do that, particularly when the computers are scattered among every Wisconsin city, village, and town; managed by an army of IT-naive temporary staff; and for which security is a responsibility split among vendors, service technicians, and local election officials.
How many elections did those old machines miscount before the recount revealed the problem to the general public?
And why didn't Wisconsin's election officials notice and correct this problem sooner?
Here's why: Statutes provide Wisconsin's local election officials with a review period following every election, called the 'canvass' during which they can review accuracy before they declare the election results final.
But the election officials don't actually review accuracy. Most clerks are more polite than you see on that Racine County video, but they all place the same blind faith in computer-calculated vote totals. Wisconsin's local election officials just point to the computer print-out and say "Oh, look who won."
On Election Night, when the City of Marinette machines produced such weird numbers, poll workers noted tabulation problems in their Election-Night written reports. Yet neither the city nor county clerks took corrective action. They knowingly certified results that were obviously missing hundreds of votes.
You won't find a county canvass anywhere in Wisconsin that does better. The Dane County clerk will tell you he's the only clerk in the state who checks machines' accuracy after every election (2 machines). But if you press, he will admit he doesn't do that during the canvass. He waits until after he has already legally sworn that the results are accurate and has declared them final.
If the WEC decides to decertify next Tuesday, we commend them for taking action to solve the Optech Eagle part of the problem. We are also asking that they take steps to solve the other half: we are asking the WEC to provide the county canvasses with more specific instructions and stronger encouragement to verify accuracy before certifying election results.
More than 20 other states have already built some kind of verification into their canvass procedures, and they do not declare election results final until they have confirmed accuracy. Wisconsin is no better off than states with paperless touchscreens if all we do is seal our paper ballots in bags and never use them to verify the vote totals.
At the very least, Wisconsin's county clerks need to begin to use simple, routine 'reasonability tests,' which are simple calculations they can do at their desks to look for vote totals that don't make any sense--and then resolve any anomalies they see.
If we have any dedicated county clerks who want to take the lead to bring Wisconsin's canvass procedures into the 21st Century, (ask yours!) our statutes already allow that clerk to adopt whatever canvass procedures he or she wants. National authorities stand ready to help with the implementation of modern methods of election auditing.
There is no reason for Wisconsin voters to continue to trust our right to self-government to anonymous computer programmers or whoever hacked in behind them, or to hope that some IT Fairy Godmother will from now on protect our voting machines from any more glitches.
Our election clerks could be checking accuracy if they chose to--and we need to insist that they do.
* Stephen Ansolabehere, Harvard University; Barry C. Burden and Kenneth R. Mayer, UW-Madison; Charles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Learning from Recounts, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2017-12. July 2017.
The investigation of the 2014 Stoughton referendum miscount that I, Julie Crego, and Sue Trace did in 2015, in collaboration with Stoughton Municipal Clerk Lana Kropf, was recognized as "helpful" by the Civic Design Project, a joint effort of the User Experience Professionals Association and the Center for Civic Design.
They recommended a post from this blog to civic design professionals working in elections as "useful" because it "discusses the causes of incorrectly counted votes by paper ballot scanner and provides suggestions for proper ballot design and election day procedures to help prevent miscount errors."
When the legislature voted to abolish the old Government Accountability Board in December 2015, it’s hard to describe how very low my expectations were for its replacement, the Wisconsin Elections Commission. Against unified opposition from citizens and media, Republican legislators destroyed our nationally admired nonpartisan panel of retired judges and replaced them with a panel of appointees selected in an openly partisan process. Independents like me have no representatives on the new Commission, nor do any third-party voters. I thanked my lucky stars that Wisconsin law still gives most direct responsibility for election accuracy to the counties. For the new WEC, I allowed myself to do no more than hope their designed-to-deadlock structure would keep them from making very many bad decisions.
Today I sat through a full-day meeting of the WEC. They made decisions regarding maintenance of the voter registration lists and certification of a redesigned voting-machine system. They discussed how to move ahead with electronic poll books. They reviewed the results of the latest round of voting-machine audits.
I saw no harm done. I saw no deadlocked decisions. I saw a few differences of opinion, but no naïve observer could have picked out the Republican appointees from the Democratic. And, Lord help me, as I observed them holding a voting-machine vendor’s feet to the fire about some less-than-user-friendly features of new voting-machine software, I found myself thinking, “I don’t remember the old GAB being this willing and able to stick up for the voters.”
Before anyone thinks I’ve gone soft, there are things I think they could be doing better. For example, while their desire to stand up for voters’ ability to cast valid votes was evident, an equal desire for evidence that those votes are counted accurately—in every election, recount or no—is not yet visible. But the members of the old GAB were only a little farther ahead in their interest in bringing routinely verified accuracy to Wisconsin election results, so we’re no worse off.
But back to the good news. The presence of two bona fide former election clerks on the new Commission—Beverly Gill, former Burlington municipal clerk, and Julie Glancy, former Sheboygan County Clerk—seems to be keeping it real when discussion turns to questions of how things will play out in the polling place.
For example, it was the former election clerks who really put the ES&S representatives through their paces in the demonstration of a new electronic ballot-marking device. Knowing how often voters are unclear about Wisconsin’s open partisan primary ballot, they made sure the ES&S representatives demonstrated that the machine worked for naïve voters without causing confusion or irritating delay. It didn’t. I won’t describe the problems, because I don’t need to. The Commissioners voted to certify the system only on the condition that the problems were fixed. In their discussion, I saw nothing but concern for the voters’ ability easily to cast a valid ballot. Zero partisanship. (To be fair, the Commissioner who looks to be most partisan based on his resume full of party offices wasn’t there today.)
In other actions, the Commission discussed the current effort to update the voter-registration lists by sending postcards to people who had not voted for four years and ‘deactivating’ those who did not respond. Their questions of staff revealed sincere concern about the possibility of purging legitimate voters as a result of the statutorily-required maintenance effort. They asked detailed questions about how many registrations would likely be deactivated, why, and for whom, and gave staff instructions about information they want to see in the report when the project is complete.
And when staff gave them the news that one older-model voting machine, the Optech Eagle, was discovered in both the recount (Marinette County) and in the voting-machine audits (Outagamie County) to have missed a significant number of votes in November's election, the Commissioners did not miss a beat before discussing decertification. Decertification would force the 140 municipalities that still use the machine immediately to replace it, and staff had not raised that possibility. Instead, staff described their efforts to get local election officials to use a work-around for the ballots most at risk of being miscounted, and to coax the municipalities into replacing the machines. That wasn’t enough for the Commissioners, who instructed staff to prepare a memo on a possible decertification plan for their next meeting, in September.
I'll soon get back to poking and prodding about bringing 21st-century elections verification practices to Wisconsin, and I won't go too much longer (right now, in fact) before I point out that I shuddered a little when the Commissioners accepted a flat "No" from the ES&S vice president in response to "Have any of your machines ever been hacked?"
In my happy dreams, the Commissioners would have responded to that evidence-free boast by asking "How do you know?" To which the honest answer would be, "We don't, really, because most states, like Wisconsin, don't check." And then the Commission would get Colorado or the Election Verification Network on the phone and get to work on promoting routine county canvass procedures that verify accuracy instead of just trusting in it.
Well, enough of that. Tonight, I'm pretty happy that this looks like a Commission that can probably give it some good thought when they get around to it.
Over the past five years, I’ve read every commercial media story I could find regarding election technology. Sadly, that has not been a big job. Few reporters ever mentioned the risks, and those who did tended to interview only election officials. The typical news item would hint ‘some are concerned’ and then quote some official saying “We see no evidence of problems.” The question of whether the officials had been monitoring for problems--or whether they even knew how to--was left unasked and unanswered.
But recently, I am noticing progress in commercial news media’s coverage of the risks of elections technology. America’s reporters are catching up with millions of citizens and all IT professionals. They are realizing that computerized elections have risks, and that IT experts understand those risks better than election officials do.
That's not the only recent improvement. Some reporters have noticed the solution, too. This morning I saw a news story in national mainstream media that went beyond hand-wringing over the risks and mentioned routine election verification.
Under the headline If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know?, NPR’s Pamela Fessler gave listeners the answer: No. Then instead of musing about hypothetical alternate technologies, she finished the piece with a plug for routine election audits. A few weeks ago, the Atlantic also had a good article focusing on election audits, with the subtitle "A low-tech solution to America’s voting problems."
Don't get me wrong. We are still not seeing the sort of explanatory or investigative journalism that our elections deserve. But things are looking up. Commercial journalists have finally found the phone numbers of election-technology experts. In recent weeks, Reuters turned to the University of Michigan’s Alex Halderman and ABC News quoted the University of Iowa’s Douglas W. Jones.
Even a city reporter, Kristian Torres of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, now knows to pick up the phone to interview Princeton’s cybersecurity expert, Edward W. Felten, when she has questions about elections technology. A local lawsuit there challenged Georgia's failure to preserve an auditable paper trail.
But when the same opportunity (that is, renowned experts explaining the local angle on a topic of national interest) presented itself to Wisconsin journalists, they missed the opportunity. Last November, when three crème de la crème national experts testified in Dane County Court, Wisconsin reporters focused on mundane, predictable angles, such as the cost of the recount.
The currently trending issue--Russian hacking--might blow over, but I don't think the improvement in reporters' understanding of the larger issues will fade. National-beat journalists are truly waking up to this issue. So it's only a matter of time before state and local journalists, too, bring some gravitas to their reporting on the topic.
I'm optimistic that we will see fewer formulaic stories approvingly quoting a clerk saying "It's all good because we have no evidence of miscounts." I'm looking forward to seeing more actual IT experts quoted.
And I can't wait to hear Wisconsin officials' answers after the next election when for the first time they face a reporter who asks, "Got it--no evidence of hacking. Now can you show us the evidence of accuracy?"
In brief: Our election officials tell us that every single valid vote and not one single invalid vote should be counted. But if you watch closely, you’ll notice that election officials tend to tolerate any size or type of miscount unless it seems to affect the outcome.
Well, which is it? Do we want 100% accuracy, or do we want only approximate election results that probably identify the right winner? Until we face the need for clear and consistent standards, we cannot hold our election officials to any.
(Updated with additional information from a June 2017 report from WEC staff--see end of blog post.)
During the 15 years I supervised investigations for Wisconsin’s legislative oversight agency, I learned the value of several specific thinking skills. One was to be clear about expectations.
Auditors call them ‘standards’. Investigations start when someone reports that something is not as it should be. A good investigator’s first step is to figure out: What is it that should be? What would things look like if everything was working right?
If, for example, the complaint is “This permitting process takes too long”, we need to know how long people expect it to take.
This habit of noticing standards—or their absence--spilled over into the rest of my life. It's useful. You probably know that you’re less likely to be swayed by a salesperson if you’ve already decided how much you want to spend before you set foot in the store.
And standards keep us heading in the right direction. As the Cheshire Cat told Alice, which way you need to go from here depends a good deal on where you want to get to.
The way things are now, however, paying close attention to the standards we set for our elections can make a person dizzy.Read more
The New York Times has published a good article about the Volkswagen fraud. In brief, Volkswagen put fraudulent emissions-control software in its autos. The cars passed government tests for years, all the while spewing pollution in real-world use.
That happened. There’s nothing hypothetical about it.
It shows us what corporations can do with the computers they sell to us.
Now consider these facts:
- Only three companies' computers count 80% of America's votes. One of them, (ES&S) counts about 50%.
- More people have more motive to manipulate elections than anyone has to manipulate auto emissions.
- IT-naïve local election officials are less capable of detecting fraud in pre-election tests than air-quality regulators are capable of detecting fraud in emissions-control tests.
And the government tests didn't even catch it. The hack was discovered by graduate students who bought a car and tested it on the road.
But in elections, no one can perform a real-world voting-machine test. Voting machine companies and election officials maintain too much secrecy.
We have to be honest with ourselves. Local election officials—bless their hearts—will never be able to manage or test their computers well enough to deter or detect any fraudulent software. At least not before the polls close.
We must demand that our election officials do what every other computer-dependent manager does: Check their computers’ output for accuracy while there is still time to correct any errors. Nothing else can protect our right to self-government from computer fraud and error.
We need genuine, reliable outcome-confirming audits of our election results, and we need them NOW.
And no, we do not want to wait, like auto regulators did, until some grad students discover that our software has been hacked for years.